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not an overwhelming burden to the
newspaper. Also, because the number of black models used would be
entirely discretionary, such requirements would not impose a
"quota" on the inclusion of black
models. Furthermore, the court
held that inclusion of such models
would not significantly burden the
numerous arbitrary decisions
made in every advertisement.
Based on the standards above, the
court held that the complaint could
not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim, as the complaint alleged a
longstanding pattern in real estate
advertisements indicating racial
preference.
Constitutional Issues
The Times also argued that section 3604(c) was void for vagueness. The court noted that regardless of whether the vagueness
doctrine applied to civil actions,
the ordinary reader standard provided constitutionally sufficient
notice of the prohibited conduct.
Thus, the statute did not fail on the
basis of vagueness.
Next, the Times claimed that
application of section 3604(c) to
newspapers violated the first
amendment. The court noted that
the first amendment gave less protection to commercial speech than
to other constitutionally protected
speech. The first amendment did
not protect commercial speech relating to illegal activity. The court
noted that the Fair Housing Act
prohibited advertisements displaying racial preferences. Therefore,
the first amendment did not protect advertisements which violated
section 3604(c) and promoted illegal activity, discrimination in the
sale or rental of real estate.
The court also addressed the
supposed unconstitutional burdens imposed on the Times by
section 3604(c). First, the court
reviewed the Times's argument
that application of the Fair Housing Act to newspapers would disrupt the function of the free press.
Citing Supreme Court precedent,
the court concluded that section
3604(c) would not compromise the
unique position of the free press.
The Times also argued that section 3604(c) would unconstitutionally burden newspapers by compelVolume 3 Number 4/Summer, 1991

ling them to enforce the law under
the Fair Housing Act. The appellate court, however, rejected this
argument. The court held that the
"would-be regulators" were not the
publishers, but the offended readers, such as Ragin and Open Housing. These readers bore the burden
of proving racial preference in the
advertisements. Therefore, the
court concluded that section
3604(c) did not place an unconstitutional burden on the publishers.
Lastly, the court dismissed the
Times's argument that the publisher was "ill-equipped" to monitor
the advertisements. The court noted that advertisements were routinely and extensively reviewed before they were published in the
newspaper. Therefore, monitoring
the advertisements for racial messages did not impose an unconstitutional burden upon the publisher.
The Second Circuit accordingly
affirmed the district court's decision and held that section 3604(c)
of the Fair Housing Act applied to
human models and that its application to newspapers did not violate
the first amendment.
Richard E. Nawracaj

No Strict Liability For
Manufacturer of
Unavoidably Unsafe
Blood-Clotting Agent
Which Gave Woman
AIDS
In Jane Doe and John Doe v.
Miles Laboratories, Inc, Cutter
Laboratories Div., No. 90-2605
(4th Cir. March 7, 1991)(WESTLAW), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that Koyne, a blood-clotting agent
manufactured by Miles Laboratories, Inc., Cutter Laboratories Division ("Miles"), was unavoidably
unsafe, and therefore, Miles was
not subject to strict liability in tort.
The court also held that Miles met
the applicable standard of care and
had no duty to warn of the possible
dangers associated with Koyne;
therefore, Miles was not negligent.

Background
In September of 1983, after the
delivery of her child, Jane Doe
("Mrs. Doe") began suffering from
excessive vaginal bleeding. After
substantial amounts of blood components failed to control Mrs.
Doe's bleeding, her physician administered Koyne, a blood-clotting
agent comprised of highly concentrated Factor IX. Factor IX was an
essential blood-clotting component derived from thousands of
human blood plasma donations
and was very effective in stopping
uncontrolled bleeding. Mrs. Doe's
Koyne was distributed by Miles in
January of 1983, which was prior
to the availability of an approved
test to identify the presence of the
human immunodeficiency virus
("HIV"), the virus responsible for
the deadly acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS"). Mrs.
Doe was subsequently diagnosed
as having been infected with HIV,
and she possessed no AIDS high
risk factors that could otherwise
account for her infection.
On August 14, 1986, the Does
sued Miles in the United States
District Court for the District of
Maryland based on strict liability
and negligence. They asked the
court to hold Miles strictly liable
based upon a finding that blood
and blood products were unreasonably dangerous products. The Does
also asserted that Miles was negligent in two ways: (1) by failing to
assure adequately the safety of
their product, and (2) by failing to
warn adequately those who administered the product of the risk that
it may transmit AIDS.
The District Court's Decision
In Doe v. Miles Laboratories,
Inc, 675 F.Supp. 1466 (D. Md.
1987), the district court initially
held that Miles was subject to strict
liability in tort as a manufacturer
of blood or blood products, and
denied Miles's motion for summary judgment. However, the district
court then reconsidered and certified to the Maryland Court of
Appeals the issue of whether a
supplier of blood or blood products
was subject to strict liability in tort.
(continued on page 142)
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The Maryland Court of Appeals
The Maryland Court of Appeals,
the state's highest court, agreed
with the federal district court that
the sale and preparation of Koyne
invoked the strict liability principles of 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. That section
imposed strict liability for harm
caused by "[o]ne who sells any
product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the
consumer...." However, the court
also held that the nature of blood
and blood products made the exemption contained in comment k
to § 402A applicable.
Comment k applied where a
product was determined to be "unavoidably unsafe" because it was
"quite incapable of being made
safe for [its] intended use." In
recognizing that blood and blood
products were unavoidably unsafe,
the Maryland Court of Appeals
identified and applied four "common threads," considered in similar cases, that were satisfied by
blood and blood products. These
were: (1) the non-existence of any
test capable of detecting the viral
agent which contaminated the
blood at the time of the injury, (2)
the great utility of the product, (3)
the lack of any substitute for the
product, and (4) the relatively
small risk of the disease being
transmitted by the product. The
high court left to the district court
the question of whether Koyne was
similarly unavoidably unsafe
based on its findings of fact.
After receiving the Maryland
Court of Appeals' response, the
district court held that Koyne was
unavoidably unsafe and therefore
granted summary judgment to
Miles on the strict liability claim.
The court also granted summary
judgment to Miles on the Does'
negligence claims. The Does appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit's Decision
The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court and affirmed the

granting of summary judgment to
Miles. In doing so, the Fourth
Circuit applied the four "common
threads" recognized by the Maryland Court of Appeals as the basis
for balancing the risks associated
with a product against the benefits
to be derived from it and the
inability to avoid the risks associated with the product.
First, the Fourth Circuit agreed
with the district court that at the
time the Koyne was administered
to Mrs. Doe, there was no way to
determine whether the blood plasma was infected with the HIV. The
facts presented to the district court
demonstrated that until early 1984
there was no consensus that the
AIDS virus could be transmitted
through blood transfusions or
blood products. In April, 1984
scientists finally identified the HIV
as the cause of AIDS, and on
March 2, 1985 the Secretary of
Health and Human Services licensed the first test for screening
blood plasma donations for the
HIV. Miles distributed Mrs. Doe's
Koyne in January, 1983, before
Miles began screening plasma donors with obvious signs of the HIV
infection in February, 1983. Based
on this, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Miles could not have
determined if the Koyne was contaminated even if they knew that
AIDS was transmitted by blood.
Second, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the district court that
Koyne had great medical utility.
This finding was demonstrated by
the material facts and was undisputed by the Does.
Third, the Fourth Circuit had
little difficulty agreeing with the
district court that Koyne had no
adequate substitute. The Does asserted that two substitutes were
available; cryoprecipitate and
fresh frozen whole plasma. However, the Fourth Circuit found that
cryoprecipitate did not contain
Factor IX, an essential and highly
effective blood-clotting component, and therefore was not an
adequate substitute. In addition,
the evidence showed that small
amounts of Koyne could replace
massive doses of fresh frozen
whole plasma. This was important
because massive doses of the fresh
plasma could have serious, life-

threatening side effects. Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that
there was no adequate substitute
for Koyne.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit was
convinced that there existed only a
relatively small risk of the transmission of the AIDS virus through
the use of Koyne. Compared to this
slight risk was evidence that in
some cases Koyne was vital to the
patient's life.
Based upon a finding that
Koyne satisfied the four "common
threads," the Fourth Circuit concluded that Koyne, because of its
unique benefits and minimal attendant risks, was an unavoidably
unsafe product that should not be
removed from the market by imposing strict liability on its manufacturers.
The Fourth Circuit also agreed
that summary judgment was proper as to the Does' claims that Miles
should have screened plasma donors for the AIDS virus and that
Miles should have warned them
that Koyne may transmit the AIDS
virus. In deciding these claims, the
Fourth Circuit first found that
Miles should be held to the standard of care, skill, and diligence
that a reasonable pharmaceutical
manufacturer would use under the
same or similar circumstances. According to the court, this did not
require Miles to screen plasma
donors for AIDS at the time the
Koyne was administered to Mrs.
Doe, as no governmental agency or
medical society recommended
such screening.
Even assuming that Miles knew
of the risk of AIDS in Koyne, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that
withdrawal of Koyne from the
market was not feasible prior to the
availability of a test to identify
conclusively the presence of AIDS
virus. The facts demonstrated that
the ELISA test, the first and only
HIV test authorized by the federal
government, was not available until 1985. Without the test, all
Koyne would have to have been
withdrawn from the market, thus
denying many in dire need of its
unique benefits. The court concluded that Miles took all necessary precautions to assure the safety of the Koyne; therefore, Miles
was not negligent in that respect.
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit held
that Miles had no duty to warn of
the risk of the transmission of the
AIDS virus in September of 1983.
Although pharmaceutical companies must warn consumers of the
reasonably foreseeable risks associated with their products, the court
concluded that they cannot be expected to warn of every possible
harm associated with those products. The evidence indicated that
when the Koyne was administered
to Mrs. Doe there was no medical
consensus that AIDS was transmissible by blood or blood products.
The closest thing Miles had to a
warning of the risk was a bulletin
issued by the National Hemophilia
Foundation in December, 1982
that described an "increased concern" with the "potential risk" of
blood or blood product transmission of AIDS. According to the
court, the knowledge of the risk at
that time was insufficient to require Miles to warn of the possibility of the transmission of AIDS
through Koyne. The court refused
to force pharmaceutical companies
to warn the public about every
possible risk associated with the
use of drugs, blood or blood products, as that would undermine the
effectiveness of the warnings regarding these products. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit held that Miles had
no duty to warn prospective users
about the risks associated with the
use of Koyne.
The Fourth Circuit's Disposition of

the Case
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that
there were no issues of material
fact necessary to the resolution of
any of the Does' claims. According
to the court, Koyne was an unavoidably unsafe product, and
therefore it was not unreasonably
dangerous. Also, the court held
that Miles complied with the applicable standard of care both in its
duty to ensure the safety of Koyne
and in its duty to warn of the
product's inherent dangers. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
summary judgment for the defendant, Miles Laboratories.
Stephen McKenna
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Eighth Circuit Holds
That Insurer's Duty to
Make Certain Coverage
Available Was Not
Breached by Failure to
Explain Such Coverage
In Edens v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, 923 F.2d 79 (8th
Cir. 1991), the court held that an
insurer made underinsured motorist coverage available to a policyholder when the insurer specifically mentioned, but did not explain
such coverage on renewal forms
and other correspondence with the
policyholder.
Background
Marcus Edens ("Edens") was
seriously injured when another vehicle struck the automobile in
which he was a passenger. At the
time of the accident, Edens was a
passenger in a car which belonged
to Irwin and Sandra Johnson ("the
Johnsons"). The Johnsons were
policyholders of Shelter Mutual
Insurance Co., Inc. ("Shelter Mutual").
The other driver's insurance
company paid Edens $25,000 in
settlement of his claim. This
amount failed to compensate him
fully for the extent of his injuries.
The Johnsons had not elected to
purchase underinsured motorist
coverage which might have entitled them to recover from their
own insurer any damages in excess
of the amount covered by the policy owned by the driver-at-fault.
Edens claimed he was entitled to
underinsured motorist coverage
under the Johnsons' policy, because Shelter Mutual did not
"make available" such coverage as
mandated in Ark. Code Ann. §
23-89-209 (Supp. 1989).
The Arkansas underinsured motorist statute provided that every
automobile liability insurer must
"make available" to its policyholders coverage protecting them
against underinsured motorists.
Edens argued that Shelter Mutual
violated the statute and that the
law should therefore impute such
coverage to the policyholders, and
thus allow him to recover under
the statute as a passenger.

Shelter Mutual asserted that it
had not deviated from the statutory requirement, and that even if it
had, there was no reason to impute
coverage. Additionally, Shelter
Mutual argued that even if coverage were imputed to the Johnsons,
Edens was beyond the sphere of
recovery since he was only a passenger in the vehicle.
Edens sued Shelter Mutual in
Arkansas state court. The suit was
removed on diversity grounds to
federal court by Shelter Mutual.
The District Court Proceedings
The United States District
Court for the Western District of
Arkansas held that Shelter Mutual's practice of offering underinsured motorist coverage to policyholders, by including an obvious
reference to it on their application
and renewal form, adequately
"made available" such coverage,
as required by the statute.
Edens contended that Shelter
Mutual had the obligation to take
affirmative, "commercially reasonable" steps to make available
its product, and that simply offering it without explanation put policyholders at a disadvantage. Shelter Mutual counterargued that it
met the "make available" standard
in the statute by providing a
"check-off" box for choosing underinsured motorist coverage,
placed three inches above the insured's signature block on the application as well as filing rates with
the state insurance commissioner.
The court found the insurer in
compliance with the statute and
granted summary judgment for the
insurer.
The Court of Appeals Affirms

Sitting in diversity to decide this
case of first impression under state
law, the Court of Appeals expressed its reluctance to expand
the meaning of the statute without
guidance from the state courts. In
making its decision, the court focused on the intent of the Arkansas
legislature, and on judicial interpretations from other jurisdictions
dealing with similar legislation.
The court gleaned the intent of
the Arkansas legislature from Arkansas statutes regulating other
(continued on page 144)
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